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ON PHILOSOPHY AND ECONOMICS
By Cass R. Sunstein*
I. INTRODUCTION
A few years ago, I attended an interdisciplinary conference on the
subject of incommensurability. The economists and the philosophers
seemed quite hostile to one another, and to be disagreeing very sharply;
but it was unclear what they were disagreeing about. The high-point, or
low-point, came when the distinguished game theorist Kenneth Binmore
asked the distinguished legal philosopher Joseph Raz, with utter
exasperation, what Raz meant by the term "the will." Was RazBinmore wanted to know-referring to a physical entity? If not, what in
the world (literally) did Raz mean? Raz responded, quietly, that he was
building on ordinary usage. Binmore made it clear that he did not
consider this an answer. It should not be surprising that no economist is
represented in the volume that grew out of the conference.'
Many philosophers are critical of economics, on the theory that
"efficiency" is not an appropriate social ideal and that the economic
conception of human motivation is extremely crude. And much of
Martha Nussbaum's recent work has consisted of a philosophical
critique of economics, or, more precisely, that form of economics that
has been especially influential in the economic analysis of law
(hereinafter EAL). Nussbaum thinks, as do many philosophers, that
economists work with hopelessly crude foundations, rooted in
assumptions that philosophers have long shown to be misguided. I
believe that Nussbaum has made a number of convincing arguments, but
Karl N. Llewellyn Distinguished Service Professor, University of
Chicago,
Law School and Department of Political Science. I am grateful to Martha Nussbaum,
Richard Posner, and David Strauss for helpful comments on a previous draft.
1.

See INCOMMENSURABILITY, INCOMPARABILITY, AND PRACTICAL REASON (Ruth

Chang ed., 1998).
2. See Martha C. Nussbaum, Flawed Foundations: The Philosophical Critique of
(a ParticularType of) Economics, 64 U. CHI. L. REv 1197 (1997) [hereinafter Flawed
Foundations];see also MARTHA NUSSBAUM, POETIC JUSTICE (1996); Martha Nussbaum,
"Only Grey Matter?" Richard Posner's Cost-Benefit Analysis of Sex, 59 U. CHI. L.

REv. 1689 (1992).
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that that these arguments are not nearly as damaging as she thinks to
conventional EAL, most charitably read. Part of the problem, it seems
to me, is that she reads EAL as if it were, or aspired to be, a branch of
political philosophy, where in fact EAL is mostly an effort to predict the
consequences of law and to understand the forces that bring law about.
EAL is concerned with testable hypotheses, a topic of little concern to
philosophers. One way to put the point is that while philosophers often
complicate ordinary understandings, by introducing further distinctions
and refinements, economists often simplify ordinary understandings in
the interest of parsimony. Nussbaum makes a number of good
criticisms of EAL insofar as it is normative or insofar as it attempts to
set forth an accurate descriptive account of practical reason; but only a
small amount of EAL is normative in the sense that she is complaining
about, and economists need not be read to claim to have a good
descriptive account of practical reason.
There is a broader lesson, involving the relationship between
philosophy and economics, and about the possibility of productive
collaboration between philosophers and economists. To the extent that
they are speaking about law, economists are especially good at
exploring the consequences, many of them apparently unintended, of
legal rules. Within the social sciences, they are especially good at
developing testable hypotheses and then testing them. Economists are
also helpful in giving accounts of how law comes into being and in
showing the best way to achieve specified ends. At the more normative
level, they are most helpful in showing that if some X is the goal, some
instrument Y will or will not achieve it. It follows that philosophical
critiques of the "foundations" of EAL-including Nussbaum's-do not,
by and large, undermine the most common and important uses of
economics in law. Economists and philosophers are generally engaged
in different tasks.
With respect to productive collaborations,
philosophers can, among other things, clarify concepts that economists
leave murky; posit ingredients in individual utility functions that
economic analysts of law might otherwise overlook; raise questions
about how to conceive "rationality"; and show difficulties in fullfledged normative work in EAL. I suggest that an especially promising
domain for productive collaborations is behavioral law and economics.
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II. ECONOMICS, EXTENDED UTILITY FUNCTIONS, BEHAVIORAL
ECONOMICS

A. Normative, Positive, Prescriptive
Let us begin with some distinctions. Economic analysts usually
distinguish between positive and normative work. Positive work is
concerned with explaining why law is as it is and with predicting the
consequences of law. Why do we have maximum hour laws? What
will happen when the minimum wage is increased? What will be the
effects of a law forbidding discrimination on the basis of sex? If the
Federal Aviation Administration requires children to have their own
seats on airplanes, how many lives will be saved as a result? What will
minimum prices accomplish? Positive work might say, for example,
that a law nominally designed to protect against air pollution was
actually an effort to help eastern coal; or that maximum hour legislation
owes its existence to the lobbying efforts of labor unions; or that the
consequence of an environmental statute, or of maximum hour
legislation, will be to help certain industries at the expense of others; or
that mandatory seats for children will actually cost lives, by leading
people to drive rather than fly, even though driving is more dangerous.
I believe that most EAL is positive rather than normative.
Normative work is concerned not with "is" but with "should," or
more particularly with what the law should do. This variety of work in
turn should be divided into two quite different subcategories: fullfledged normative work and work that might be called "prescriptive."
Sometimes economic analysts assume that some specified goal is
desired-less pollution, higher employment of women, fewer workplace
injuries, increased income for the working poor, or (more
controversially) greater aggregate social wealth (or "efficiency"). Some
normative work does not evaluate the specified goal, but simply says
how to get there; it is purely instrumental. If the goal is less pollution, a
gas tax may be better than technological requirements imposed on new
cars. This important kind of work is what I am describing as
prescriptive.
Much more ambitiously, some (actually only a little) normative
work in EAL argues on behalf of a contested social maximand, such as
utility maximization or wealth maximization, or urges that the law
should take a certain course because it will promote that contested
maximand. Thus it might be said that the law should do X because X is
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efficient in the sense that it will maximize wealth. To take a vivid
example, consider a recent and somewhat hilarious article in the Journal
of Legal Studies, defending a ban on flag-burning on the ground that
people may well be willing to pay a good deal to prevent flag-burning;
the upshot of the article is that a ban on flag-burning may be justified
because such a ban might be efficient.3
The idea that "wealth maximization" is the appropriate goal of a
social order is not very plausible, and its leading defender, Judge
Posner, no longer defends it. To be sure, some work in EAL, and even
more casual talk within EAL, urges, or even takes it for granted, that
"efficiency," or "wealth maximization," is what the legal system should
pursue. But this work is best taken more modestly as prescriptive-as
suggesting that to the extent that efficiency is sought, some strategy X
or Y will or will not achieve it. There is no good defense of the idea
that efficiency is the only thing that should concern a good social order,
and most people in EAL are aware of this fact. Very little of economic
analysis of law amounts to full-fledged normative work. EAL is
dominated by positive and prescriptive analysis.
B. Parsimony,Testable Hypotheses, and Puzzles About Preferences

Prescriptive and positive work in EAL often attempts to propose
hypotheses and then to test them. The minimum wage will increase
unemployment; the implied warranty of habitability will result in
increased rents or a diminished housing stock for poor people; a right to
be protected against arbitrary discharge will make employers more
reluctant to hire people in the first instance. To have a testable
hypothesis, the analyst must make parsimonious assumptions. With a
"full" or "rich" account, we might be able to capture the nature of
practical reason; but it is unlikely that we will be able to generate and
then to test hypotheses. I will simply assert, without defending the
point, that with respect to positive and prescriptive work, EAL has
produced extremely important advances, and it is the best (indeed the
only) game in town. At the same time, the predictions are often quite
crude, involving the direction of effects rather than their magnitudes,

3. See Eric Rasmusen, The Economics of Desecration:Flag Burning and Related
Activities, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 245 (1998).
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and the bare notion of "rationality" is often too thin and formal to
produce robust predictions.4
Whether positive or normative, economics tend to work from a
simple foundation, involving the idea of "preferences." People-it is
assumed-"have" preferences, and they seek to satisfy them. This idea
plays a central role in EAL. The best defense of the assumption
involves the goal of parsimony. But there is ambiguity in the very
notion of a "preference." Sometimes the term preference refers to
"choices"; sometimes it refers to the motivations that lie behind and
help explain choices. Thus, it might be said, John prefers chocolate to
vanilla, because (and to the extent that) John chose a chocolate cone
over a vanilla cone; or it might be said that the reason for this choice is
that John likes chocolate best.5
All this raises an obvious question: What are people's preferences?
To get either prescriptive or positive work (or for that matter normative
work) off the ground, this question has to be answered. Some economic
analysts of law seem to say or to assume that people are rational, selfinterested profit maximizers-or simply to say or assume that people
want more money rather than less. For many purposes, an assumption
of this sort is sufficient to produce progress; consider the question
whether compulsory seats for children on airplanes will increase safety,
or whether doubling the minimum wage will increase unemployment.
But three issues arise at this stage, and in at least some contexts, these
issues appear important. First, the term "rational" has to be specified,
and it might be understood in many different ways. Sometimes people
do not seem rational in the sense assumed. They rely on heuristics, or
rules of thumb, that lead to errors; they show biases and confusions of
multiple sorts.7 Second, sometimes people seem concerned with things
other than self-interest, narrowly construed; they are sometimes willing
to sacrifice material self-interest for the sake of other goals, including
reputation, status, and fairness.'
Third, sometimes people show
bounded willpower; they can be myopic or impulsive, and they may
even take steps to counteract these tendencies.
4. See Christine Jolls et al., A BehavioralApproach to Law and Economics, 50
STAN. L. REv. 1471, 1485-89 (1998).
5. The distinction is discussed in CASS R. SUNSTEIN, FREE MARKETS AND SOCIAL
JUSTICE ch. 2 (1997).
6. See Jolls et al., supra note 4.

7.
8.

See id.
See Matthew Rabin,

Incorporating Fairness into Game Theory and

Economics, 83 AM. ECON. REv. 1281, 1282 (1993).
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These various issues-relating to questions of rationality,
willpower, and utility function-have received considerable and
growing attention within economics and EAL. For example, Gary
Becker-a founder of and an inspiration for EAL-has worked with the
idea of an "extended utility function" that includes people's concern for
things other than self-interest, narrowly defined. 9 Becker and his
followers are well-aware that people are not solely concerned with
material goods.
In addition, those interested in behavioral law and economics have
argued that bounded rationality and bounded self-interest raise serious
problems for some aspects of conventional law and economics.' Thus
it can be shown that people often care about being perceived as fair, and
they will sacrifice their material self-interest, in some circumstances, to
achieve this goal. Work on prospect theory and on heuristics and biases
has raised questions about conventional assumptions about rationality."
It is generally agreed that the future task is to go back and forth between
hypothesis and data, to see what understanding is falsified or confirmed
by evidence. At this stage it should be clear that philosophical questions
about what people really care about are receiving considerable attention;
the problem is understood as an empirical one to be resolved by
exploring actual behavior. Behavioral economists, like conventional
economists, are interested in producing testable hypotheses. Sometimes
the simple assumptions of conventional EAL may be enough for
positive and prescriptive work; sometimes behavioral work provides a
necessary corrective. A great deal of additional thinking and research
would be helpful in sorting out the resulting questions.
III. NUSSBAUM'S PHILOSOPHICAL CRITIQUE
With this as background, let us examine some philosophical issues.
Nussbaum offers a number of challenges to what she sees as economic
analysis of law. The challenges can be organized into three categories,
involving human motivation; incommensurability and plural utility; and
deliberation about ends and agency. Obviously these criticisms raise
important issues about how to achieve an adequate descriptive account
of practical reason, and they are also significant from the normative
point of view. But the question is how much they touch the positive and
9.
10.
11.

See GARY S. BECKER, ACCOUNTING FOR TASTES ch. 1 (1996).
See Jolls et al., supra note 4, at 1485-89.
See id.
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prescriptive tasks of economic analysis of law, and-since most
economic analysis is both positive and prescriptive-to what extent
they work as convincing criticisms of most of economic analysis of law
in its current form. How do these points work as objections to
conventional economic analysis? How might they be made into a basis
for better prescriptive and positive work? To what extent can they help
in the creation of testable hypotheses?
A. Human Motivation

Nussbaum complains of the "reduced number of explanatory
entities behind human action. Indeed, the capacious category of
'preference' seems to cover all of the psychological underpinnings of
action, both cognitive and conative."' 2 By contrast, philosophers "have
agreed that the explanation of human action requires quite a few distinct
concepts," including "belief, desire, perception, appetite, and emotionat the very least."'' 3 Similarly, Nussbaum objects that homo economicus
"is a self-interested maximizer of his own satisfactions"; that under
EAL, altruism is "reduced to a type of egoism, in which people get
reputational or psychic goods for themselves"; and that it is necessary
at a minimum to recognize "sympathy and commitment as independent
sources of motivation."
It should be granted that in order to have a good descriptive
account of people's self-understandings, the various ingredients of
motivation must be disentangled from one another. But the degree of
refinement depends on the author's particular task; a novelist (Henry
James is an obvious example) may be concerned to offer an especially
fine-grained account, while a philosopher may reject the coarsest
accounts while offering a manageable number of distinctions. An
economically oriented analyst of the law has a different task, and should
not be taken as a philosopher manqu6.
The question is what account of motivation is helpful for the
Perhaps a
particular tasks that economists set for themselves.
parsimonious account will do and be especially useful by virtue of its
simplicity. For example, how much must be posited about motivation in
order to know the effects of a law increasing the minimum wage, or
imposing a warranty of habitability, or allowing workers to cartelize, or
increasing cigarette taxes? If economists offer a simple account of
12.

Flawed Foundations,supra note 2, at 1208.

13.

Id. at 1209.
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motivation-that people want, in these contexts, to increase their
profits-why and how will they go wrong? It is not clear how a richer
understanding of motivation will lead to better predictions and
prescriptions, at least in areas of this kind. At least the philosophercritic might want to go through such areas to see what account of
motivation will lead to better predictions.
Nussbaum can be understood to be making several different points
here; they should be addressed independently.
1. She might be saying that economists do not understand the
complex subdivisions of people's motivations. This may or may not be
true; the economist may say, plausibly enough, that she is working with
a simple account to see where it leads (in terms of predictions or
prescriptions). Whether the simple account does well depends on what
the evidence shows. A complex account-involving "belief, desire,
perception, appetite, and emotion-at the very least"-is not likely to
do better and may well do worse, simply by virtue of its complexity.
(Are the distinctions among desire, appetite, and emotion, for example,
important for the positive and prescriptive work of economic analysts of
law? Exactly where do they go wrong when they ignore those
distinctions? Do these distinctions matter for purposes of understanding
the effects of a regulation requiring parents to purchase seats for their
children on airplanes?)
2. Nussbaum might be arguing that people are not egoists, that is,
they care about the well-being of others. This is sometimes true, and as
noted it is a chief inquiry of behavioral economics and in the recent
work of Gary Becker. Perhaps some economic analysis goes wrong
because it disregards the existence of altruism; 4 but this does not seem
to be a challenge to economic analysis of law as such. It is instead a
point about the actual contents of people's utility functions. The point
may be important; perhaps people will not behave in the predicted ways
precisely because they care about others. But then the natural question
arises: Where, concretely, does Nussbaum think that economic analysts
have gone wrong because of their failure to understand altruism or other
motivational forces? To answer this question, undoubtedly it will be
necessary to be highly particular and concrete, and undoubtedly to
distinguish among different areas. In family law, there is probably more
altruism than in commercial transactions. A casual survey of articles in

14.

See Jolls et al., supra note 4, at 1485-89.
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the Journal of Legal Studies and the Journal of Law and Economics
suggests that very few, if any, of the articles are vulnerable to this kind
of critique.
3. Nussbaum might be saying more specifically (with Amartya
Sen 5) that sympathy (a regard for the well-being of others) and
commitment (a belief in certain principles) can motivate human action.
Sympathy and commitment are qualitatively different from "tastes" or
"desires." For some purposes this is both true and important. But for
purposes of predicting behavior, when is it necessary to emphasize this
point? Is this important to understand the effects of a change in the
Clean Air Act or an increase in the minimum wage or of a rent control
law? This is an empirical question, and perhaps the answer is not
straightforward. The question, for those pressing this challenge, is
whether it can be turned into testable hypotheses that perform better
than conventional economic hypotheses. This is in a sense exactly what
behavioral economics, and those interested in behavioral law and
economics, are trying to do.
Nussbaum is right to argue that people sometimes behave in
accordance with nonmaterial incentives. Perhaps they do not breach
contracts, even though it is efficient to do so, because of their
commitment to certain principles, or because of reputational incentives.
If this is a philosophical point, it is also a way of starting to frame a
hypothesis, which might actually be tested. Someone interested in EAL
would ask: To what extent is this true? And if it is true, how is
economic analysis impaired?
Suppose, for example, that we think of an extended utility function,
including not only material self-interest but also a taste for fairness. As
noted, much of behavioral economics has been concerned with this
issue. How, if at all, does the extension of the utility function adversely
affect EAL?
Nussbaum gives few examples.
I conclude that
Nussbaum's discussion of human motivation makes some valuable
points; that those points work against some cruder hypotheses in EAL;
but that they do not amount to a general or fundamental criticism of
EAL, because Nussbaum's concerns have been taken up both by Becker
and his followers and by those interested in behavioral economics. A
lurking question is whether a fine-grained philosophical account of
motivation is by itself too fine-grained to be a basis for predictive social
science. The question for the future is whether philosophical challenges
15. See Amartya K. Sen, Rational Fools: A Critique of the Behavioral
Foundationsof Economic Theory, 6 PHIL. & PUB. AlT. 317, 317-44 (1977).
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of this kind can be used in that way. What can philosophers add to the
economic picture of motivation, in such a way as to produce hypotheses
that might be tested and shown to be correct?
B. Commensurabilityand Plural Utility
Nussbaum believes that a "commitment to the commensurability of
all an agent's ends runs very deep" in EAL. She links this commitment
with the project shared by Plato and Sidgwick, a project that is, in her
view, "radically revisionary," rather than merely reportorial of how
people are. 16 It follows that what EAL does is to envision a "a world
remade, not the world we live in." Thus EAL adopts "a perspective of
lofty detachment" that "has flattened and simplified things that are
usually messy and real."' 7 In support of her challenge to EAL, she
claims that this criticism "is by now a common point in mainstream
economics," and invokes Amartya Sen's work on "plural utility," which
sees utility "primarily as a vector (with several distinct components),
and only secondarily as some homogenous magnitude."' 8
Here too we need to make some distinctions. There need be no
quarrel with Nussbaum's claim that an adequate view of people's selfunderstandings, or of practical reason, will raise doubts about the view
that all human goods are commensurable. 9 And I agree with
Nussbaum's argument that a world of genuine commensurability would
represent a revision (for the worse) of our actual experience, a revision
that would make much of that experience unrecognizable. 2 But it is not
clear that EAL is really committed to denying this point; recall that it is
working with parsimonious assumptions in order to make predictions.
Thus the question is this: In what sense and to what extent is an
emphasis on incommensurability and plural utility a criticism of EAL,
16.

FlawedFoundations,supra note 2, at 1199.
Id.; see also ELIZABETH ANDERSON, VALUE IN ETHICS AND ECONOMICS (1993).
I believe that Anderson's influential and very illuminating book also misconceives the
project of much economic thinking, which is to generate predictions. Her account of
rationality offers many insights into practical reason, but it is not at all clear that it could
17.

generate any predictions at all.

18.

See Amartya Sen, Plural Utility, 81 PROC. ARISTOTELIAN SOC'Y 193, 193-215

(1981)
19. See ELIZABETH ANDERSON, VALUE IN ETHICS AND ECONOMICS (1993); JOSEPH
RAz, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM (1986); see also Matthew Adler, Law and
Incommensurability: Introduction, 146 U. PA. L. REv. 1169 (1998) (introducing
Symposium on Law and Incommensurability); Cass R. Sunstein, Incommensurability
and Valuation in Law, 92 MICH. L. REv. 779 (1994).
20. See RAz, supra note 19 (discussing constitutive incommensurability).
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especially insofar as it is engaged in positive and prescriptive tasks?
This is less clear.
Nussbaum contends that an assumption of
commensurability is "too simple to lead to illuminating and pertinent
prediction." This is plausible in some settings; perhaps a claim of the
commensurability of all outlets for sexual gratification will make
predictive mistakes.2' (It is not clear that these mistakes are a result of a
commitment to commensurability or instead a misspecification of what
is included within most agents' utility functions.) But when? And
when is the daily work of EAL undermined by its assumption of
commensurability?
Let us assume, for example, that observers are trying to predict the
effects of the English Rule (requiring losers to pay attorney's fees and
costs) on plaintiffs who have a low probability of prevailing, or that we
are interested in knowing the consequences of final-offer arbitration, or
that we want to know what will happen to marriage rates when
contraception is readily available, or that we are trying to figure out why
central banks are independent, or that the government seeks to
understand the consequences of a mandatory paid-leave program.
(These examples are chosen from a random sampling of recent papers in
EAL.) In these contexts, does an emphasis on incommensurability and
plural utility undermine in any way EAL? Does such an emphasis help
to produce testable hypotheses that compete with those of EAL?
I do not mean to suggest that this question has no answer-only
that philosophers, including Nussbaum, have not provided one. Her
discussion of incommensurability and plural utility operate at a high
level of abstraction and seem to engage mostly descriptive questions
about practical reason, and also normative issues. But here is a possible
place where Nussbaum might look for support. In some contexts,
people seem to think certain reasons for action are entirely inadmissible;
they are blocked, not outweighed. 2 People may think, for example, that
they will not gossip about a friend's misfortune simply because it is fun
to do so, or that they will steal a book from a friend's office simply
because they know that they would love that book (while the friend
doesn't much enjoy owning it). Their refusal to make all goods and
options commensurable is accompanied by, or helps generate, a series
of excluded reasonsfor action.23

21. Cf. RICHARD A. POSNER, SEX AND REASON (1992).
22. See JOSEPH RAZ, PRACTICAL REASON AND NORMs 34-48 (1975) (discussing
exclusionary reasons).

23.

See id.
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I am not sure that whether and to what extent this phenomenon
makes trouble for the conventional uses of EAL, but it is possible that it
does so in some important settings. At the very least, it raises some
difficulties with the (normative) claim that cost-benefit analysis should
be the foundation for policy. Some things for which people are willing
to pay ought not to count as reasons for action; consider a desire not to
see flag-burning,24 or racial intermarriage. In addition, the metric of
dollars elides important qualitative differences among social goods, and
people ought to see those good for themselves. 2' These points do raise
questions about cost-benefit analysis as a normative foundation for
policy. But as I have emphasized, most uses of EAL do not involve that
normative foundation; they involve instead positive and prescriptive
issues. It remains to be seen how economic analysis of these issues is
adversely affected by ignoring problems of incommensurability and the
possibility of "plural utility."
C. Ends: Of Deliberationand Agency
Nussbaum believes that economists and rational choice theorists
share a "dogma" to the effect "that we can deliberate rationally only
about the instrumental means to ends, and not about the content of ends
themselves." She says that the dogma "relies on the idea that our ends
are hard-wired by exogenously given tastes." She believes that
philosophers like David Wiggins and Henry Richardson have shown
that people "do deliberate in life, in [a] holistic manner that seeks broad
coherence and fit among our ends considered as a group. 26 In her view,
EAL "cannot afford to proceed as though all these arguments do not
exist." In a similar vein she thinks that people are not merely concerned
with end-states but also with their own agency, which they "value and
pursue." The key problem here is that EAL focuses "on well-being to
the exclusion of agency," something that Nussbaum thinks produces
predictive, explanatory, and normative problems.
From these points, I am not sure exactly what Nussbaum thinks
that economic analysts of law are doing wrong. She appears to think
that those analysts think that all tastes are "hard-wired." But few
economic analysts make this (utterly implausible) claim. Some tastes
are of course hard-wired; there is much room to debate how many, and
24.
25.
26.

See Rasmusen, supra note 3, at 245.
See Sunstein, supra note 5, ch. 4.
Flawed Foundations,supra note 2, at 1208.
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which, have biological roots. But for purposes of most EAL, the answer
to that debate does not seem to matter much (except to the extent that it
is being assumed that tastes, because hard-wired, cannot be changed; of
course government can affect choices even with respect to hard-wired
tastes, by raising the price of some choices and decreasing the price of
others).
A second possibility is that Nussbaum is urging that tastes are not
"fixed." This complaint seems right, in the sense that sometimes neither
choices nor motivations are unmalleable; and the complaint is a
reasonable criticism of some conventional EAL. Consider, for example,
the fact that the initial allocation of an entitlement may affect both
choices and tastes, and the possibility that laws forbidding employers
from firing workers without cause, or requiring recycling, may affect
both preferences and decisions. Thus prescriptive and positive work
may go wrong if it disregards the preference-shifting effects of law.
The efficiency consequences of legal rules-even the consequences
themselves-may be hard to assess, or may have to be assessed
differently, if legal rules will actually change tastes and values. It is
possible that laws against discrimination will have preference-shaping
effects; 27 so too with laws forbidding sexual harassment; so too with
laws regulating the content of television. Behavioral work has even
questioned the idea of stable, context-independent preferences.2
But here we have an empirical question, not a philosophical
question: Under what circumstances, and why, do tastes change? This
question might well be turned into testable hypotheses. Both ordinary
and behavioral economists have been grappling with aspects of that
issue and in particular with the preference-changing effects of
entitlement allocations.
In any case, what is important to know is
when preferences are not fixed, and why, and what changes them, and
how this is relevant to the predictive tasks of EAL. In some contexts,
the phenomenon of shifting tastes may not matter at all to EAL. The
fact that preferences are malleable does not seem to matter much to
analysis of farm subsidies or milk price supports, for example.
A third possibility-and the one most consistent with the flavor of
Nussbaum's text-is that Nussbaum is objecting most of all to the fact

27. See Gary S. Becker, Nobel Lecture: The Economic Way of Looking at
Behavior, 101 J. POL. EcON. 385, 386 (1993).
28. See Paul Slovic, The Construction of Preference, 50 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 364

(1995).
29.

See RICHARD H. THALER, QUASI RATIONAL ECONOMICS (1991).
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that EAL ignores the human capacity to choose ends, rather than simply
to pursue them. It is true that people are sometimes self-conscious
about their ends; but we need to know exactly what kind of criticism
this is. To be sure, some economists appear to write as if ends are
simply "there" and are not products of deliberation and choice. Here
too a descriptive account of practical reason will fail if it does not see
how this process occurs.
It is important to make some distinctions here.
Consider
Nussbaum's claim that "this is how we really do deliberate in life, in
this holistic manner that seeks broad coherence and fit among out ends
considered as a group." This appears to be an empirical claim; is it
true? What evidence is there on its behalf? Undoubtedly some people,
some of the time, do deliberate in this way; but the picture seems to
ignore both the (qualitatively diverse) costs of deliberation and simple
self-interest, which can make people unwilling to be holistic. Often
people do not attempt to seek "holism." For present purposes the more
important question is this: How, exactly, is the economic analysis of law
undermined by the fact that people deliberate about ends? The basic
method of EAL is to use a utility function of some kind; it does not
much matter whether the ends emerge from deliberation, from biology,
from government propaganda, or from Mars. Most of the positive work
of EAL seems unaffected by this fact; so too with prescriptive work.
What remains to be seen is whether some positive and prescriptive work
would look different if it took on board the fact that people deliberate
about ends.
Nussbaum is surely right to say that agency is an important and
separable part of well-being. People care not merely about end-states
but also about their ability to choose. But it is not clear how and to what
extent this is a criticism of EAL. The first point is that the incorporation
of agency as a part of well-being creates no special problems for the
vast bulk of work on EAL. The second point is that, to the extent that
economic analysts refer solely to end-states, and place no special
premium on choice as such, there is certainly a problem at the normative
level. But there is no reason not to include agency as part of the set of
things that people care about, as certainly they do. (How much do they?
This is an interesting empirical issue.) The typical economic approach
would be to value agency, like everything else, in terms of private
willingness to pay. Now this idea does raise serious normative
problems. Not all goods should be valued from the standpoint of private
willingness to pay. But that is a very different question.
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A question for the future is how EAL might incorporate people's
agency, and their protectiveness of their own agency, into positive or
prescriptive analysis. An interesting aspect of cost-benefit analysis,
especially in the context of environmental amenities, attempts to do this.
People value not simply beaches and parks as experiences, but also the
option to visit beaches and parks. Hence "option value" is a distinct
component of value, studied by those interested in contingent valuation
studies. Those studies raise many problems, but here at least is an area
in which economists have been studying how much people value
options. Perhaps this incipient work could be used by EAL to obtain
valuation of agency as well as end-states.
IV. CONCLUSION

The most serious problems with EAL are normative, above all in
the suggestion that all preferences deserve support, regardless of their
origins or of the reasons brought forward on their behalf. Some reasons
for action are properly blocked, even if they are based on private
willingness to pay. Sometimes the genesis of wants can help "impeach"
them.30 There are positive and prescriptive problems with EAL as well,
with its conception of rationality and its understanding of what people
seek to maximize; some of these are receiving attention with behavioral
economics and with the idea of an extended utility function. Sometimes
the idea of "preferences" is far too crude for normative or even positive
work, as where it is not disaggregated into intrinsic value and
reputational value. Further disaggregations may sometimes prove
useful.
Nussbaum's criticisms of EAL therefore contain some important
points, especially (not only) in terms of capturing people's reflective
self-understandings and from the normative point of view. But the
criticisms seem to me overstated, above all because they operate at a
high level of abstraction, do not engage the day-to-day work in EAL,
and fail to show that the criticisms are well-taken from the standpoint of
positive analysis and predictions, where parsimony is crucial. To return
to my basic themes: What testable hypotheses are suggested by the
philosophical critique? How does a more fine-grained understanding of
human motivation falsify concrete work in economic analysis? Why is
it a problem, for predictions about the effects of law, if values are
30. See JON ELSTER, SOUR GRAPES: STUDIES IN THE SUBVERSION
(1983); AMARTYA SEN, COMMODITIES AND CAPABILITIES (1985).

HeinOnline -- 19 QLR 347 2000

OF RATIONALITY

QLR

[Vol. 19:333

incommensurable, or if people deliberate about ends, or if people do,
and should, care about their agency? Nussbaum tends to read economic
analysts of law as if they were badly educated philosophers, and to see
EAL as if it were making a set of philosophical claims and arguments.
But this is not its point.
For the future, I believe that a suitably advanced version of
behavioral economics may well meet most of Nussbaum's complaints
on both the positive and the prescriptive sides.
Whether those
complaints are correct, on those sides, depends on going back and forth
between hypotheses and evidence; philosophical abstractions will not by
themselves provide much help. With respect to prescriptive work, EAL
makes important advances by showing that certain means of achieving
agreed-upon ends will not accomplish that goal. Insofar as EAL attempt
to posit a single goal (economic efficiency) for a well-functioning
society, it is not worth taking seriously, for reasons that Nussbaum (and
others) have shown; but very little work in EAL depends on accepting
that goal, or even urges that it should be accepted.
There are some lessons here for both economists and philosophers,
and for the appropriate division of labor, as well as for constructive
engagements, among them.
Economists tend to be simplifiers;
philosophers tend to be complicators. EAL should be taken to be
arguing about the effects of legal rules; if simple assumptions lead to
false assessments, then by all means let us see if better assumptions
would do better. Philosophers are in a good position to produce a
clearer understanding of the concepts at work, and of the normative
goals that the legal system does, or might, attempt to pursue. What I
have attempted to do here is to suggest that many of the apparent
disagreements between economists and philosophers are not
disagreements at all, but misunderstandings about one another's tasks
and goals. To the extent that there are disagreements, they might be
made the basis for a research program in which alternative hypotheses
might be generated and tested. Productive collaborations between EAL
and philosophers-long overdue-might involve the generation of those
alternative hypotheses and an exploration of how they might be tested. I
have not described such a research program here, but I hope to have
indicated a few places where those interested in such a program might
start.
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